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For this edition of DIFFRACTIONS which focuses on the idea of ​Suspicion we had              
the opportunity to interview Rita Felski and ask her several questions that shed light              
on both her work and the theme of this issue. Rita Felski is a ​well recognized scholar                 
in the fields of aesthetics and literary theory, feminist theory, and cultural studies.             
She is the author of several books including: “Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist            
Literature and Social Change”, 1989; “The Gender of Modernity”, 1995; “Doing Time:            
Feminist Theory and Postmodern Culture”, 2000; “Literature After Feminism”, 2003;          
and “Uses of Literature”, 2008. In 2015 she wrote, “The Limits of Critique”, which              
addresses the hermeneutics of suspicion as mood and method and, more recently,            
she co-edited “Critique and Post-Critique”, 2017. Felski is currently completing a new            
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In this interview Felski carefully explains Paul Ricoeur’s notion of hermeneutics of            
suspicion, and some of the reasons why Ricoeur referred to Marx, Nietzsche and             
Freud as the “masters of suspicion”. She also highlights the relationship between the             
hermeneutics of suspicion and critique which forms the central argument of “The            
Limits of Critique” where she insists that critique is necessary, but that perhaps             
critique should not be seen as the predominant strategy for interpreting text. Felski             
expresses serious reservations with the idea that “the gaze of critique is a gaze that               
claims to understand other people better than they know themselves”. So, rather            
than using critique to question the common sense, Felski encourages us to see             
critical thinking as a dialogue​, ​​and as part of the ‘ordinary world’. During this              
interview we also touch on the relationship of academic work with both everyday life              
and art. We discuss the importance of affect in criticism as a step towards rethinking               
the idea of suspicion; and we end up with discussing the current relevance of              
suspicion in relation to the current political climate in the United States and how the               
idea has been used within the media and as part of the construction of the notion of                 
‘Fake News’.  
 
S.M. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a term associated with Paul Ricoeur’s work and             
his interest in the writings of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud - whom he called “the               
masters of suspicion”. Is it possible to summarise what were, for Ricoeur, the main              
features of suspicion? 
 
R.F. Ricoeur, is a philosopher of interpretation, perhaps the most interesting thinker            
drawing on the tradition of hermeneutics. His emphasis is on the hermeneutics part             
of suspicion rather than on suspicion itself, if you like. He does not talk about               
suspicion as a sensibility, or as an affect, or as a feeling – he is using the idea of                   
suspicion to clarify a certain way of interpreting text. That is very much his main               
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And, of course, one main tradition of hermeneutics comes from religious           
interpretation - there is a long history of people deciphering the bible and trying to               
make sense of what they see as God's word. So, that form of hermeneutics is what                
he calls either a “hermeneutics of revelation” or “hermeneutics of restoration”. That’s            
a kind of interpretation where you’re reading below the surface, you’re looking for             
hidden meanings but, you’re doing so in the hope that you will uncover a kind of                
deeper truth, or revelation; and your attitude towards the work is of great respect,              
especially in the case of the Bible. By contrast, he sets up his idea of the                
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ that he sees as distinctively modern. I think he would             
argue that you could not have an hermeneutics of suspicion in the medieval period;              
that is that it is a distinctively modern idea because it goes along with the growth of                 
scepticism, a distrust toward authority, a Kantian emphasis on the need to use your              
own reason to question tradition, to question authority, to question conventions, or            
behaviour, or belief, and so on. In that sense, a hermeneutics of suspicion is a term                
he uses to talk about the significance of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. He sees them               
as these great “masters of suspicion”. 
 
Why are they masters of suspicion? Because, they no longer either treat things at              
face value, nor do they read them as interpreters of the Bible might have done, in a                 
state of reverence and trust in what they are reading. On the contrary, they read               
suspiciously, they read skeptically, and they assign negative motives to whatever it is             
that they are interpreting. You no longer assume that your interlocutor, or the culture              
that you’re looking at has positive, or benevolent impulses. Rather, you assume that             
the world around you is a screen for power, for control, for social hierarchies, and the                
function of culture is to hide those hierarchies. So, you read a text suspiciously in               
order to uncover what is supposed to remain hidden. But a key point here is that,                
Marx, Freud and Nietzsche - well, Nietzsche to a much lesser extent, but certainly              
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interpreting is, in fact, the world around them, culture as a whole – the realm of                
ideology for Marx, of everyday rationalisation and conventions around sexuality and           
behaviour, and so on, in Freud. So, the hermeneutics of suspicion in this context is a                
way of interpreting the world. But, then of course, it gets taken over later to talk about                 
the interpretation of literary works. 
To summarise it in another way, the spirit of a hermeneutics of suspicion is a spirit of                 
disenchantment, that is what makes it, according to Ricoeur, a distinctively modern            
idea. Disenchantment is an idea from Weber, is the idea that as we move towards               
modernity we give up on religion, we give up on faith, we become sceptical, we want                
to demystify. So, for Ricoeur, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche are the great ​de​m​ystifiers. 
  
S.M. After Ricoeur, several misappropriations of the term suspicion as an iconic            
instrument of doubt seem to have followed. What would you identify as a             
misappropriation in this context? 
  
R.F. I don’t think that Ricoeur’s term has been misappropriated. Certainly, it was an              
influential concept that was taken up a lot, for example, in religious studies. One of               
the points of my book on critique is to say, in fact, that in literary studies, or media                  
studies, and cultural studies, and indeed in everyday life, we are all engaged in a               
hermeneutics of suspicion. Sometimes in a good way, sometimes in a bad way.             
However, people don’t really use the term hermeneutics of suspicion very widely. So,             
part of the intervention of my book was to say that I look around me and see many                  
scholars in literary studies, cultural studies, media studies, sociology, a range of            
fields who are engaged in a practice of (something they call) critique. Critique is the               
common word now in use: one says, I'm going to critique this movie, or I'm going to                 
engage in a critique of assumptions about sexuality, or I'm going to engage in a               
critical reading of this work of literature. So, people normally talk about themselves             
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Portuguese, but certainly in English, and I think also to a certain degree German              
Kritik, and the French notion of ​critique has that resonance of a sceptical             
interpretation. So, what I was trying to do in “Limits of Critique”, was to say: well, we                 
all think we’re engaged in something called critique, but let's take this idea from              
Ricoeur of the hermeneutics of suspicion, which I think actually explains what we’re             
doing quite well, and then see how that gives us a different understanding of our own                
practice. Does that make sense? 
  
S.M. Yes, and connecting with what you just said, in your latest work, you propose a                
redefinition, or reinscription, of the notion of “hermeneutics of suspicion”, which is            
something that has evolved throughout your writing. Can we go back to 2003, the              
year your book ​“Literature After Feminism” was published​, and ask if it was there that               
your interest in the notion of suspicion sparked? And, if so, have this interest              
determined your research since then? 
  
R.F. I think it came a bit later. In “Literature after Feminism” I did explicitly turn                
towards aesthetic questions. The book was not so much a new work of research as               
an attempt to provide an overview on debates on feminism. I deliberately chose not              
to organise the book around political categories, as most overviews of feminism had             
been organized: Marxist feminism, liberal feminism, whatever it might be. So, I            
decided instead to organise the book around literary categories like author, narrative,            
literary value, and so on. Part of the reason was to address the claim that feminism                
had neglected literary questions. But in my view, this was not the case. I believe that                
feminists had thought a great deal about the value and the importance of literature,              
and so I wanted to convey that in the book. So, in that sense, I suppose it was a                   
slight turn away from suspicious reading, or an explicitly politicised form of reading.             
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So, I'm now trying to finish a trilogy: “Uses of Literature”, which came out in 2008;                
“The Limits of Critique”, which came out in 2015; and now, I’m finishing a third book                
called “Hooked: Arts and Attachment”, which deals in more detailed with the            
experience of becoming “hooked” to works of literature and art. Why do we care              
about some novels or films or paintings, while others leave us cold? Bourdieu, of              
course, has tried to answer these questions, but I find his answers insufficient. It was               
when I started writing “Uses of Literature” that I began asking basic questions that I               
felt had been pushed aside in criticism. Questions like: Why do we like to read? Why                
do people choose to read literature? And, what happens when you read literature? I              
felt that those simple questions have been pushed aside because the assumption            
was, for example, that academics knew much better than ordinary readers why the             
latter choose to read literature. There was often an explanation in terms of large              
political structures that the reader did not see, but the critique could see. Most of the                
interpretations we had were either purely aesthetic accounts, coming out of a            
Kantian tradition which said that when we experience literature we have this purely             
disinterested aesthetic experience. Or else, on the other hand, you had political            
interpretations of what happens when we read: we are either being shaped by some              
dominant ideologies; or in engaging with literature and art we are criticising those             
dominant ideologies. However, I felt that reducing aesthetic experience to either a            
purely disinterested phenomenon, or conversely to a set of political categories, was            
far too reductive. 
  
So, what I did in “Uses of Literature” in 2008, was try to highlight four common                
experiences that happen when people read. Experiences that I think are central to             
both everyday reading and academic reading; to look at both [ways of reading] in              
their phenomenological and sociological dimensions; to think about their aesthetic          
and political aspects; and to emphasise the very different ways people respond to             
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yourself in a book; I had a chapter on the idea of ​knowledge​: to what extent can                 
literature give us knowledge. Those two chapters were concerned with the more            
cognitive dimensions of literature, literature as a form of reflection, as a form of              
thinking Then the other two chapters dealt with a more kind of affective, more              
visceral aspects of reading. I had a chapter on ​shock​: the experience of shock in               
reading, whether in relation to Greek tragedy or avant-garde art; and I had a chapter               
on experiences of ​enchantment​: for example, when you feel absolutely absorbed,           
caught up in a literary world, you lose and forget everything that is around you and                
you become absorbed in this magical fictional world. So, it was really in that book               
that I tried more fully to flesh out alternatives to thinking critically. And, because of               
the responses to that book, I felt that people had not fully understood, or I hadn’t                
adequately explained, what I saw as being the limits of suspicious reading. That’s             
why I then went on to “The Limits of Critique” to try to explain more clearly, as best                  
as I could, why I thought - not that critique was wrong, because we obviously do                
critique and critique is necessary - but why perhaps critique should not be seen as               
the primary or the only way of interpreting texts. 
  
S.M. In the introduction of “Critique and Post-Critique” you (and Elizabeth Anker)            
propose that “rethinking critique can (...) forge stronger links between intellectual life            
and the non-academic world”. You even reinforce this idea stating that there is a              
necessary “recognition that scholars have much to learn from engagement with           
non-academics”, especially in the field of art and literature because of their creative,             
innovative, world-making practices. What would be a good example of this           
relationship between academics and non-academics to rethink critique? 
  
R.F. There are probably two issues in that question: one is the relationship between              
academic work and everyday life; and the other would be the relationship between             
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the only one engaged in these issues, I have a colleague, Toril Moi who wrote a                
book about a year ago, which overlaps with mine quite closely. Like Toril, I’m              
interested in the realm of the everyday life, and the realm of the ordinary. So, one                
could say, as I argue in “The Limits of Critique”, that critique relies on a distinction                
between those who are engaged in critique and those who are the objects of critique,               
to put it simply. One way I phrase it (in something I am writing now) is that there is an                    
asymmetry, an epistemological asymmetry in this way of thinking, between those           
who know and those who don’t. So, the gaze of critique is a gaze that claims to                 
understand other people better than they know themselves. These people might           
have some explanations or motives for their actions, but the practitioner of critique             
comes along and says, well, you are being driven by these structures -             
neoliberalism, sexism, or whatever it might be, that you fail to understand, and I am               
here to explain why that is happening, and to help you think more adequately. Now, I                
have serious reservations with that way of thinking. Obviously, we can disagree with             
people with different political views to ourselves. But I don’t think we should articulate              
that critique by assuming that they don’t know what they are saying, they don’t know               
what they are doing, and they are simply the pawns of larger structures while we are                
able to see through those structures. So, in that context rather than using critique to               
question common sense, to question everyday life, to question the ordinary world, I             
have much more interest, like Toril Moi, in seeing critical thinking as in dialogue​, ​​and               
indeed as a part of the ordinary world and not standing above it. Rather than using                
critique to diagnose what is around us, let's use it to see what we can learn from the                  
world around us. That could mean, learning from conversations with your           
neighbours, or somebody at the supermarket, or wherever it might be. 
 
It could also, of course, mean learning things from works of art. In fact, the idea that                 
we can learn from works of art is hardly controversial; many practitioners of critique              
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Woolf”, because they offer critical perspectives on society – so, the idea that we can               
turn to art for insights into reality is not a new idea. But what I am suggesting, or                  
Elizabeth and I were suggesting, is that we can look to art not just for examples of                 
critique; we should turn to literature not just because it challenges, or subverts             
things, but also because it ​makes ​things. One of the points I make in “The Limits of                 
Critique” is that when we value art, we tend to value it in terms of words beginning                 
with a de-, we value art because it ​​de​m​ystifies, because it de​c​onstructs, it             
destabilizes. Defamiliarising, for example, is a keyword. We have this modernist           
mindset – shaped especially by Brecht - that says, we should admire literature             
because it defamiliarises us from the ​​status quo​.​ But, what I'm trying to argue, with               
others alongside me, is: let's also look at what art creates, let’s look at its imaginary                
worlds let's see how it changes our perception in positive ways, let's look at how it                
gives us hope, or beliefs, or rich fantasies, or a range of possibilities. 
 
For example, I'm writing now about a memoir called “Lost in Translation”, by Eva              
Hoffman, who moves as a young Polish-Jewish woman to Canada and then the             
United States. There is an interesting exploration of the affective experience of            
nostalgia. The book is all about her love for Poland, and her suffering in being               
estranged from Poland. Now, if I look at my academic articles on nostalgia, they are               
very critical of nostalgia, they tend to treat it with suspicion. They are certainly very               
suspicious of love for your country, of the love of home, which they tend to see as                 
very reactionary. But it seems to me that reading this text can actually give us a                
richer understanding of how people are moved by nostalgia, and the importance of             
affective attachments. It's not in order to dismiss the critical perspectives, but to             
counterbalance them with a more affirmative understanding, or a more sympathetic           
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S.M. In “Critique and Postcritique​” you also mention the role of affect in criticism. You               
mentioned that the greatest concern is that “a pervasive mood of suspicion, ennui, or              
irony, in this regard, can easily become debilitating, both intellectually and politically”.            
Do you believe that Bruno Latour and Eve Sedgwick were already acknowledging            
the role of affect in criticism and thus responding to this debilitating aspect of              
suspicion? And how, in your opinion, can affect respond effectively to this concern? 
  
R.F. Eve Sedgwick was of course one of the big players in the whole argument               
around the limits of the hermeneutics of suspicion. She wrote a very influential essay              
back in the 1990s, and at that point, she countered the idea of hermeneutics of               
suspicion with the idea of a reparative reading that was psychoanalytically based.            
So, Sedgwick has been particularly important for that turn to affect. Latour, I think,              
not so much. I mean, I haven’t read everything he written because he is very prolific                
but I have read all his books and a large number of articles, and as far as I know he                    
doesn’t have any kind of systematic treatment of affect, although it comes up in his               
“Inquiry into Modes of Existence”. Certainly, one of the points of Latour ́s work is to                
get us away from a meta-language that allows us to ignore or override what people               
are saying about their attachments. He says, people experience works of art, and             
they say they feel things about works of art, so, let's take that feeling seriously.               
That’s part of his commitment to taking seriously what people are doing. And, so,              
similarly, I would also argue that if affect, or emotions, are one of the reasons people                
turn to works of art, we should take that motivation seriously. 
 
In terms of my own position in affect studies, I do want to stress that affect cannot be                  
separated from reason, that emotion and thought are entangled up in a whole range              
of ways, that feeling is linked with interpretation. So, on the one hand, I do want to                 
argue for the importance of feeling in interpretation, and the importance of affective             
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very much interacting with each other. Sometimes one is more central than the             
other, but they shouldn’t be seen as mutually exclusive. Perhaps another thing worth             
mentioning in the context of affect is that one of the main points of “The Limits of                 
Critique” was, in fact, to reinterpret critique in terms of the notion of affect. When               
people are engaged in forms of philosophical or political critique, they normally see             
themselves as being engaged in a purely intellectual enterprise. They might engage            
in a critique of the sexism of Marxist thought; or say that they are going to engage in                  
a critique of the ​racial ideologies implicit in Jane Austen. So, one of my points in “The                 
Limits of Critique” was to argue that the hermeneutics of suspicion is not just a mode                
of interpretation, it's also an affect, it's also a disposition, it's also an orientation, it's               
also a stance, it's also broadly an emotion. I mean, it's not a strong emotion, but it's a                  
kind of general stance of suspicion, skepticism, weariness. Could we adopt other            
kinds of affective stances to works of art? 
 
There is now quite a lot of interest in these questions. There are several recent               
books that are emphasising the importance of ​​hope​.​ If we have too much emphasis              
on scepticism and despair, people just become disempowered, they feel          
disheartened, they feel unable to act. So, we need to counterbalance that with             
paying more attention to things that can inspire us, and encourage us, and makes us               
go out and do things in the world. So, I think affect is very important. But again, I                  
would say, affect cannot take place at the expense of thought. It's not enough to say,                
we need more positive feelings in criticism. We need to say, what would be the               
intellectual pay-off of these feelings in criticism. Positive feelings in themselves are            
not good, you have to demonstrate why they have some value. 
  
S.M. Would it be possible to consider your own work on suspicion a symptom of the                
discussion surrounding humanities in the U.S. and also in Europe? Isn’t the thought             
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R.F. So, in “The Limits of Critique”, I’m very much writing about the academic context               
in the United States. Because of cultural imperialism, of course, what happens in the              
United States has some influence on what happens in the rest of the world.              
Academic trends in the United States do also influence other countries. I'm not an              
American, actually I have British and Australian citizenship, but I’ve been in the             
United States for 24 years, and so I was trying to describe what I saw as the main                  
trends. They are certainly not the only trends, and even within the United States, as I                
tried to suggest in the book, they are distributed in various ways. For example,              
critique is more central to some journals than others, or more central to some fields               
than others. There are certainly other people that are doing other things, other than              
critique - they might do bibliographical studies, or close readings, or digital            
humanities that is not explicitly critical, there are a range of different options.             
However, critique has been particularly predominant in the United States, for a range             
of reasons. And literary studies has been more emphatically politicised in the United             
States than in other countries - both in positive ways and, perhaps sometimes in less               
positive ways. So, I was really trying to describe that particular intellectual formation.             
I’m talking primarily about literary studies in the United States, and not so much              
about other fields however, I think that some of what I'm saying also relates to other                
disciplines. 
 
My work has been taken up by people working in other fields, such as sociology and                
intellectual history, because perhaps some of these practices of critique, obviously,           
have a broader significance across other disciplines in the humanities. I do think that              
to some extent critique is not so widely prevalent in Europe as it is in the United                 
States. Again, of course, this needs to be differentiated by discussing specific            
countries, and so on, but that is certainly my impression and that impression has              
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is a kind of substantive tradition of more philological, a more literary historical             
engagement with works that is not so much explicitly, or emphatically politicised, or             
so closely linked to social movements, as in the United States. 
 
I would like to emphasise that the extent to which critique needs to be criticised in                
terms of its limits, or the extent to which critique needs to be affirmed, because there                
has not yet been enough critique, will vary significantly according to different            
contexts. I went to Poland a few years ago to give a talk and I met a feminist                  
intellectual who said to me, “we don’t need to talk about the limits of critique in                
Poland, we need more critique in Poland, we haven’t had enough critique”. Her             
perception, was that in Poland the teaching of literature is still very much caught up               
in a nationalistic paradigm, it's all about affirming the greatness of Polish literature as              
creating the nation, and so on. There is not the same history of critiques of literature                
that we’ve had in the United States for 50 years. So, the question, of how much                
critique you want, or how much questioning of critique you want, is going to vary               
quite significantly according to different national, literary, and cultural contexts. My           
book has sometimes been misread as saying, “we shouldn’t be doing critique”. That             
is the last thing I'm saying! I was trained in the Frankfurt school tradition of Marxist                
thought, that is my intellectual history and it remains important. What I'm saying is              
that critique is not ​special. Critique often presents itself as being the most radical              
form of thinking, the most rigorous form of thinking. Indeed, as the only acceptable              
form of thinking in academia. I'm just bringing it down to earth and saying, well               
critique is one way of approaching works of art, it’s one way of thinking              
philosophically, but there are other ways. Rather than assuming that critique is the             
only way to go, let's pay attention to our own particular intellectual situation. Let's try               
to work out whether or not it is necessary for this particular context and that goes for                 
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S.M. With the discredit of reality shifting political positioning, e.g. the obsession with             
news by conservatives, has suspicion become more conservative than subversive? 
  
One of the points that Latour makes in his famous essay about critique running out               
of steam – and I agree, and I also talk about it in my own book – is that the                    
defenders of critique are still often stuck in a certain kind of mindset. To put it                
crudely, the mindset is: the population as a whole are naive believers, they trust              
everything that the government tells them, they accept everything. The only people            
who are critical and suspicious are intellectuals; that to be critical and suspicious is,              
by default, a marginal position, it is, indeed the position of the superior intellectual              
who see things that others don’t see. Well, Latour says, now that is not the case                
anymore. “I go to my French village and I can talk to my neighbours and some of                 
them argue that no one ever landed on the moon, it was a kind of a con-job put out                   
by the American government.” There is this kind of pervasive suspicion, from the             
ground upwards, that much of what goes on, what we see in the news, or what we                 
see in the world is fabricated and circulated by elites to serve their own agendas. So,                
now what could be seen as being suspicious, being sceptical, being critical, is a              
position in no way limited to – or exclusively linked to – the work of intellectuals.                
There is a widespread populist suspicion now, a distrust of facts, a questioning of              
assumptions. You go on twitter and you find that anything that anyone says can be               
challenged due to its dubious motives and that line of argument is used as much by                
the right as by the left. So, the idea that there is something intrinsically radical in                
questioning and criticising is no longer plausible. In a certain context, yes it can be,               
but critique is not automatically subversive anymore. 
 
Editorial note: because we had the privilege of interviewing Rita Felski life on Skype,              
we decided to maintain the conversational tone in the transcription of the interview.  
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